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7. Answering the say for no pay
Christoph Van der Elst
7.1 INTRODUCTION
Executive remuneration is the hottest topic in corporate governance. 
Remuneration is considered key in the alignment of the interests of 
 management and shareholders. But until recently it was exclusively 
the board of directors that held the reins of executive remuneration. 
Shareholders were, at best, merely informed of the remuneration packages 
 managers were provided with. Voicing the shareholders’ views on pay was 
a  footnote in the minutes of the general meetings. For a number of years 
now, however, there has been a wave of ‘say on pay’ legislation enacted in 
countries around the world, including the US, Australia, Italy, Belgium, 
the Netherlands, Sweden and so on. Shareholders are provided with 
the power to vote in some manner on the remuneration of top manage-
ment. It is said that this say on pay shifts powers from the (supervisory) 
board back to the shareholders, enabling them to hold the reins of execu-
tive pay.
Over the last few years, in countries that have enacted say on pay legisla-
tion, the remuneration agenda item has been one of the most discussed. It 
is regularly found that shareholders have refused to approve this agenda 
item. According to Semler Brossy (2015, 2), every year between 1.4 to 2.7 
per cent of the American Russell 3000 companies fail their say on pay 
vote. Consequently, the say on pay vote should also have an important 
signalling effect. Knowing shareholders will vote on the remuneration 
package, it is likely that boards will take into account that only appro-
priate remuneration packages will be backed. However, the most recent 
developments in say on pay practice indicate that the shift of power is 
far from absolute. Pay packages are still skyrocketing according to some 
studies (Weaver 2016), and the pay for performance relationship is low, 
according to many studies (Bebchuk and Fried 2004, 6). Studies of the 
effects of the say on pay in the American Dodd-Frank Act 2010 show that 
low support increases research and development, capital expenditures and 
dividends but it has no effect on the market value of the firm (Brunarski 
M4327-WATSON_9781847203489_t.indd   151 23/06/2017   10:46
152 Innovations in Corporate Governance
et al. 2015). Say on pay does not automatically have a deterrent effect on 
pay packages, and the American system, whereby shareholders are not 
mandatorily provided with an annual say on pay, results in the insulation 
of shareholders from voting on the remuneration (Weaver 2016). The 
advisory nature of most say on pay systems is not helpful in mitigating the 
nonalignment of remuneration of the CEO and the shareholders’ interests 
either. During the 2016 general meeting of Renault, the French car manu-
facturer in which the French government holds 20 per cent of the shares 
and 23.5 per cent of the voting rights (Renault 2015, 7), 54 per cent of the 
shares were voted against the remuneration package of €7.3 million for 
the CEO. The board of directors of Renault made the decision to leave the 
remuneration package unchanged, which upset the French government, 
including the president who threatened to introduce more stringent rules 
(Stothard and Chassany 2016).
Outside the United States the effects of say on pay, and more particu-
larly how companies respond to the dissenting vote on the remuneration 
report, have not been addressed in a qualitative study. This research aims 
to fill this gap. It studies the effects of the voting down of the remuneration 
report, and suggests improvements to the existing system in light of the 
findings of companies’ responses to dissenting shareholders.
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 7.1 provides an overview of 
the current regulatory state of say on pay in the United Kingdom and 
Belgium. Both countries have introduced a mandatory but advisory say on 
pay vote on the remuneration report: the UK in 2002 and Belgium in 2012. 
Before the enactment of the law, both countries had an advisory say on 
pay in their corporate governance code. Section 7.2 studies the evolution 
of the voting results on the remuneration report in the UK and Belgium. 
In both countries, significantly more opposition can be found to the 
general meeting’s remuneration report than to most other voting items. 
Section 7.3 surveys the companies that experienced a dissenting vote on 
their remuneration report over the last five years. Identifying the reasons 
that shareholders provide for a dissenting vote, the section also reviews the 
evolution of the stock price around the time the remuneration report was 
disapproved. Further, it addresses the adjustments of remuneration prac-
tices in the aftermath of a dissenting vote. Finally, the section highlights 
the effect of these adjustments on the voting outcome at the next general 
meeting. Section 7.4 discusses these findings and advises policy makers of 
a number of improvements to the say on pay mechanism.
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7.2  THE LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK OF SAY ON 
PAY
7.2.1 The United Kingdom
Historically, the office of director is aligned in law with that of a trustee 
and is not entitled to be remunerated, unless explicitly provided for by the 
shareholders’ meeting. In the case Re George Newman & Co (1895, 686), 
it was held that:
Directors have no right to be paid for their services, and cannot pay themselves 
or each other, or make presents to themselves out of the company’s assets, 
unless authorized so to do by the instrument which regulates the company or 
by the shareholders at a properly convened meeting.
Hence it is up to the shareholders to set the remuneration package of the 
directors or authorize an alternative mechanism in the constitution. The 
latter mechanism is standard. It is common that the articles of association 
delegate the general meeting’s power to authorize payment of directors’ 
fees to the board (Mclaughlin 2013, 232). The Companies Act 1985 (UK), 
carried forward in the Companies Act 2006, stated that the shareholders 
must approve payments for loss of office as a director and the particulars 
of the proposed payments be made available (Companies Act 1985, s 312; 
Companies Act 2006, s 221). Exceptions are made for small payments of 
less than £200 (Companies Act 2006, s 221), for pensions, for the discharge 
of an existing legal obligation or damages for a breach of such an obliga-
tion (Companies Act 2006, s 220).
Since the late 1980s, interest in remuneration of directors has increased. 
The Cadbury Code of 1992 started a debate on shareholder involvement in 
the remuneration practices that has remained a political and regulatory issue 
up to the present day. In that Code it was only recommended that sharehold-
ers vote for service contracts of directors lasting for more than three years. 
Say on pay was not considered best practice. On the contrary, the Cadbury 
Committee (1992, [4.43]) considered say on pay to be unworkable:
A director’s remuneration is not a matter which can be sensibly reduced to 
a vote for or against; were the vote to go against a particular remuneration 
package, the board would still have to determine the remuneration of the direc-
tor concerned. In addition, there are such practical considerations as the need 
to agree directors’ remuneration on appointment.
This view quickly changed. In 2002 the UK was the first country to adopt 
mandatory nonbinding shareholder votes on director compensation (say 
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on pay), according to The Directors’ Remuneration Report Regulations 
2002 (DRR). Directors of a listed company must provide a yearly remu-
neration report, which must be put to the vote of the general meeting of 
shareholders (Companies Act 1985, s 241A). Schedule 7A of the DRR 
2002 provides the details of the content of the remuneration report. The 
first part must not be submitted to the external auditor’s review, while the 
second part must be externally audited.
In the first part of the remuneration report, the following information 
must be provided:
1. The remuneration committee and its composition.
2.  A statement of the company’s policy on directors’ remuneration, 
which must address: the performance conditions for each director 
for share options or a long-term incentive scheme (LTIP) and the 
reasons why these particular conditions have been selected; the 
methods for assessing whether the conditions have been met, if 
any; the external factors for comparison with other companies, if 
any; the amendments of the terms and conditions and entitlements 
not subject to performance conditions; the relative importance of 
the elements related to performance (and those not related to per-
formance); the duration of contracts; and the notice periods and 
termination payments.
3.  A line performance graph which compares the performance of the 
company’s shares with those of an index.
4.  The date of each service contract, the unexpired term and the details 
of any notice periods, any provision for compensation payable upon 
early termination of the contract, provisions allowing to understand 
the liability of the company for early termination.
In the second part of the remuneration report, audited information must 
be provided:
1.  The remuneration of each director (split in fixed fees, bonuses, 
expenses, compensation for loss of office, other benefits and the 
total).
2. The nature of non-cash elements of remuneration.
3.  The share options, with the awarding price, the exercise price, date 
and expiring date, the performance criteria, and the market price of 
the exercised share options as well as of the unexpired share options at 
the end of the year.
4.  Any agreement or arrangement under which money or other assets 
may become receivable by a person and which includes one or more 
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qualifying conditions with respect to service or performance that 
cannot be fulfilled within a single financial year (LTIP).
5. Details of the pension scheme and the excess retirement scheme.
In the Companies Act 2006 another remuneration issue is put to a 
 shareholders’ vote. Shareholder approval is required in advance of direc-
tors’ service contracts of longer than two years. While it is only the term 
exceeding two years that needs shareholder approval (Companies Act 
2006, s 188(2)), a copy of the entire proposed contract must be made 
available for inspection by the shareholders (Companies Act 2006, s 
188(5)). More generally, all service contracts of directors must be held 
available for inspection free of charge at the company’s registered office 
or a place specified in the regulations (Companies Act 2006, ss 227, 228). 
The DRR Regulations 2002 were re-enacted in schedule 8 of The Large 
and  Medium-sized Companies and Groups (Accounts and Reports) 
Regulations 2008.
In June 2012, the Department for Business Innovation and Skills 
(BIS) released a consultation proposing a binding say on pay in the UK 
(BIS 2012b, 15). BIS found in a study that in a significant number of 
cases, the management of the company failed to respond to substantial 
shareholder opposition against the remuneration report, and argued that 
the advisory vote had limited effect (BIS 2012a, 11).1 BIS proposed to 
introduce two separate votes. The first vote is for the policy report ‘setting 
out all elements of a company’s remuneration policy and key factors that 
were taken into account in setting the policy’ (BIS 2012b, 4). This vote 
will be mandatory and binding when the remuneration policy is set or 
changed. The second, advisory vote regards the implementation of the 
policy, ‘setting out actual payments to directors and details on the link 
between company performance and pay’ (BIS 2012b, 4). It resulted in the 
Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013 and the Large and Medium-
sized Companies and Groups (Accounts and Reports) (Amendment) 
Regulations 2013, which came into force on 1 October 2013.
The latest set of rules requires the remuneration report to contain three 
separate parts: an annual statement, the annual report on remuneration 
and  the directors’ remuneration policy. The annual statement can take 
the  form of a letter of the chairman of the remuneration committee 
providing summarized information of the major decisions on directors’ 
1 BIS does not take into account the rejection of the remuneration report, but 
referred to four companies that experienced shareholder opposition of more than 
20 per cent four times, in a time frame of nine years.
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remuneration, substantial changes made and an explanation why these 
changes have been made.
The annual report on remuneration must contain the single total figure 
of remuneration of each director, with the total amount of salary and 
fees, all taxable benefits, receivables as a result of the achievement of 
performance measures related to a period ending in that year (short-term 
incentives), those for periods of more than one financial year (long-term 
incentives), the pension and any other item of remuneration. Each of these 
remuneration elements must be further set out in sufficient detail. The 
requirements resemble the DRR Regulations 2008 but also contain new 
requirements such as the aforementioned single total figure of remunera-
tion. Another novelty is the disclosure of information regarding the votes 
of the resolutions to approve the remuneration report and the remunera-
tion policy and ‘where there was a significant percentage of votes against 
either such resolution, a summary of the reasons for those votes, as far as 
known to the directors, and any actions taken by the directors in response 
to those concerns’ (Large and Medium-sized Companies and Groups 
(Accounts and Reports) (Amendment) Regulations 2013, cl 23(c)). The 
UK Corporate Governance Code Provision E.2.2 was upgraded by the 
requirement of an explanation of what actions the board intends to take 
to understand the reasons behind the vote result when, according to the 
board, a significant proportion of votes have been cast against a resolution. 
However, the corporate governance provision envisages all resolutions, 
whereas the law only requires action of the board in case a remuneration 
resolution encounters significant dissent. Neither the Regulation nor the 
Corporate Governance Code provides guidance as to what should be 
considered a significant proportion. In the CG100 and Investor Group’s 
Directors’ Remuneration Reporting Guidance (2016, 24) it is suggested:
to consider votes against in excess of 20% as being significant, although there 
may be reasons why, for some companies, a higher or lower level might be 
more appropriate. . . . Companies may wish to consider disclosing in the annual 
remuneration report the level of votes against that they deem to be ‘significant’.
The report continues by stating that this proportion can be taken as a 
benchmark if the number of votes withheld passes this threshold.
The third part is that the directors’ remuneration policy must be sub-
mitted to a binding vote at least once every three years. Section 439A of 
the Companies Act 2006 requires the directors’ remuneration policy to 
address the matters mentioned in s 421(2A) which refers to the statutory 
instruments that must make sure that ‘any information required to be 
included in the report as to the policy of the company with respect to the 
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making of remuneration payments and payments for loss of office (within 
the meaning of Chapter 4A of Part 10) is to be set out in a separate part of 
the report’. This policy must be provided in extenso in the report and must 
set out the company’s approach to all different aspects of the remunera-
tion that can be found in the single total figure table, including the recruit-
ment, the service contracts and the payments for loss of office.
7.2.2 Belgium2
The Belgian legal rules relating to compensation are straightforward: 
the company’s articles of association (or, if they are silent, the general 
meeting of shareholders) determine both whether the directors shall be 
remunerated3 (Companies Code 2012, art 517) and, if they are to be paid, 
the remuneration package for the services as board member (Willermain 
2008, 236). Alternatively, the shareholders at the general meeting could 
indirectly decide to pay the directors by approving company accounts in 
which remuneration is included as a cost (Willermain 2008, 236, note 95). 
The general meeting of shareholders’ decision about the remuneration of 
the directors only relates to the total amount granted to the board of direc-
tors. The board of directors decides how this total compensation package 
will be divided between the directors (Willermain 2008, 237).
In 2002, the statutory creation of a modified two-tier board structure 
in the Belgian Companies Code affected the director remuneration rules 
(Law of 2 August 2002, Official Gazette 22 August 2002). Firms have the 
option, through their articles of association, to empower the board of 
directors to delegate a large part of its powers to a management commit-
tee. In the event that the company’s articles of association do not provide 
rules for setting the compensation of management committee members, 
the board of directors is empowered to set the remuneration package 
(Companies Code 2012, art 524). The board of directors has the power 
to set the pay of the corporate senior officers, such as members of the 
management board and officers empowered to execute the day-to-day 
management of the company. The duties of the executive board members 
are therefore split between board membership and providing their services 
as executives.
Shareholders’ powers to determine executive compensation at Belgian 
2 This part has been taken from my co-authored article Thomas and Van der 
Elst 2015, 675–8.
3 The Belgian director can be remunerated, but does not have to be (Companies 
Code, art 517).
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companies were increased after the financial crisis and the national and 
international debates regarding excessive remuneration of top execu-
tives. The law of 6 April 2010 altered the corporate governance rules for 
executive pay for listed and state-owned companies (Law of 6 April 2010, 
Official Gazette 23 April 2010). As a result, in their annual reports Belgian 
firms must now include a corporate governance statement, as well as a 
detailed remuneration report. Moreover, they must establish a remunera-
tion committee, set criteria for the variable part of the executive remunera-
tion and have generous golden parachutes approved by the shareholders.
In addition, the general meeting of shareholders must vote every year 
on the company’s remuneration report; a say on pay vote. According to 
the Companies Act, the remuneration report must provide detailed infor-
mation on eleven remuneration items: (i) the process the board used in 
developing the remuneration policy; (ii) a statement of how the directors 
applied the remuneration policy during the accounting period; (iii) the 
remuneration package of each individual non-executive board member; 
(iv) the remuneration that senior executive officers receive for their role 
as directors; (v) the criteria and procedure to grant performance-related 
pay to executive board members and senior executive officers; (vi) a 
detailed description of the individual remuneration package of the chief 
executive officer; (vii) a detailed description of the global remuneration 
package of the other senior executive officers; (viii) the number and main 
characteristics of shares, options and other rights granted, vested and/or 
executed; (ix) severance pay commitments; (x) the applied severance pay, 
if an executive board member or senior executive officer has departed; and 
(xi) clawback provisions for variable pay based on misleading financial 
information (Companies Code, art 96, § 3).
The shareholder vote is advisory, so that the company is not obliged 
to revise any contractual engagements. Nor does the disapproval of the 
remuneration report affect the validity of the company’s financial state-
ments. However, if the shareholders disapprove the remuneration report, 
the board of directors is likely to revise the company’s remuneration 
policy.4 The disapproval leaves the company in doubt as to which of the 
different remuneration report components drove the shareholders to vote 
against the report.
The law of 6 April 2010 amended the Belgian Companies Code to give 
shareholders further power to restrict the structuring of the variable remu-
neration package and the share-based remuneration of the  executives. It 
4 Reported in Belgian House of Representatives (22 December 2009), report 
2336/001.
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now requires a shareholder vote, or a facilitating article of association 
(Belgian House of Representatives 2009, 18),5 if the remuneration package 
of an executive board member or a senior executive provides for variable 
remuneration of which more than half is based on performance criteria 
of one year or less, or grants more than one quarter of the variable 
remuneration based on performance criteria measured over less than two 
years, or awards more than one quarter of the variable remuneration 
based on performance criteria measured over less than three years (art 
520ter Companies Code). This provision is not applicable if the variable 
part of the remuneration is less than 25 per cent of the total remunera-
tion. Furthermore, the Belgian Companies Code also requires share-
holder approval, or a facilitating article of association, to deviate from a 
minimum vesting period for shares and share-based remuneration. Shares 
must not be vested earlier than three years after they are granted, while 
share options or other share-based benefits must not be exercisable earlier 
than three years after they are granted (art 520ter, § 1 Companies Code; 
De Wulf, Van der Elst and Vermeesch 2010).6 Finally, severance pay 
arrangements with executive directors and senior executive officers that 
exceed the amount of 12 months7 remuneration8 require the preapproval 
of the general meeting of shareholders.9
The 2010 legislation made a lot of the best practices of the Belgian 
Corporate Governance Code of 2009 redundant. The Corporate 
Governance Code contained no fewer than 18 ‘comply or explain’ pro-
visions on the remuneration of the board of directors and senior man-
agement, relating to the principle that the company must compensate 
the directors and executive managers fairly and responsibly (Corporate 
Governance Committee 2009, 21–3). Next to five non-specific principles 
on the remuneration report and conflicts of interest regarding the fixation 
of remuneration, the Corporate Governance Code contains three provi-
sions on the remuneration of non-executive directors, the remainder being 
provisions on the remuneration of the executive directors and managers, 
5 Which the general meeting of shareholders must provide for in the amend-
ment of the articles of association.
6 This provision is not applicable if the variable part of the remuneration is 
less than 25 per cent of the total remuneration (De Wulf et al. 2010).
7 In legal doctrine, it is debated whether the legislation requires the approval 
of the general meeting of shareholders from 12 months onwards (De Wulf et al. 
2010, 946), or from 18 months onwards (Wyckaert and Boedts 2010, 306).
8 The Dutch wording in the law is ‘wage’.
9 The next general meeting of shareholders must preapprove this severance 
pay arrangement. The arrangement is null and void if this procedure is not applied.
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the contracts of the latter and severance pay arrangements. For executive 
directors and managers, an appropriate part of the compensation must be 
tied to company performance and individual performance of these persons 
(Provision 7.11). Severance pay arrangements for early termination of the 
contract must be specified and should not exceed 12 months’ fixed and 
variable pay or 18 months’ pay except for justified reasons specified by the 
board of directors (Provision 7.17).
The Corporate Governance Code requires full transparency of the 
remuneration package of the CEO and of the other executive members 
in the remuneration report. Information on the compensation package 
should be split into fixed remuneration, variable remuneration, pensions 
and other remuneration elements (Provision 7.14–15). The criteria for 
setting the variable remuneration and the term of evaluation must also be 
disclosed in the remuneration report (Provision 7.12). Next, shareholders 
should be informed about the number of shares, options and other rights 
to acquire shares granted, executed and lapsed at individual level, includ-
ing their key features (Provision 7.16). Share (option) schemes should be 
approved by a general meeting of shareholders and contain a vesting term 
of not less than three years (Provision 7.13).10
7.3 SAY ON PAY IN BELGIAN AND UK PRACTICE
7.3.1 Introduction
Say on pay legislation shifts power from the board of directors to the 
shareholders. While previously the board held the reins over the com-
pensation packages of top executives, part of this power—depending on 
how the say on pay was enacted in a particular country—has shifted to 
the shareholders. Consequently, companies have to devote time in their 
reporting to remuneration practices. It immediately became clear that 
the vote provided shareholders with a powerful tool for ventilating their 
discontent. From the start in 2003, GlaxoSmithKline saw its remunera-
tion resolution defeated because of the US-style pay package for its CEO, 
requiring a lot of effort from its chairman to restore the trust of its major 
shareholders and the investor community. Gradually say on pay was 
embedded in corporate governance practices. This section discusses the 
evolution of say on pay practices in the UK and Belgium.
10 The vesting term is a guideline that is not subject to the mandatory comply 
or explain part of the Code.
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7.3.2 UK Practice of Say on Pay
The remuneration agenda item developed into the most critical item at many 
general meetings of shareholders, both in the UK and in Belgium. For the 
UK, both Conyon and Sadler (2010) and more recently BIS (2015) found 
that pay resolutions received on average three to five times more dissenting 
votes than other voting items. Figure 7.1 summarises the findings of these 
and two other studies. While non-voting items never breached the thresh-
old of 3 per cent on average, the voting items went as high as 11 per cent 
on average in 2012, according to the BIS study. Over the longer term, the 
different studies indicate that say on pay started off with a high opposition 
rate in 2002, which fell in the years after its introduction. The years of the 
Note: study Alissa: 217 companies of the FTSE 350 companies; study Conyon et al.: all 
listed companies in the proxy voting agency Manifest database; study BIS: 93 companies 
selected from large (>20000 employees), medium (<20000 employees) and small companies 
(SME EU definition) (for 2014 report and policy); own research: 226 companies of the 
FTSE 350 (Roy Coenders provided research assistance).
*: Conyon’s study is based on all remuneration items: the directors’ remuneration report, 
resolutions on share options, on long-term incentive plans and resolutions related to 
bonuses.
Sources: Alissa 2015, table 2; Conyon and Sadler 2010, 304, figure 1; BIS 2015, 208, figure 
16.
Figure 7.1  Evolution of the dissenting votes for the remuneration reports* 
in the UK
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financial crisis experienced an increase, after which the average dissenting 
levels further dropped to less than 5 per cent in 2015. This trend summarises 
the findings; a limited number of large companies sometimes experience high 
opposition, which was the case in 2012 when the BIS study, with its smaller 
sample, identified a peak in shareholder opposition. While the samples in the 
four studies presented in figure 7.1 are different, the dissatisfaction is calcu-
lated in a similar way: the total number of votes cast against the proposed 
item, together with the votes that were positively abstained or withheld, 
divided by the total votes cast and withheld. It is however common in the 
UK to report the proportion of votes cast for the agenda item, divided by the 
votes for and against, without the votes withheld being taken into account.
7.3.3  Belgian Practice of Say on Pay
Starting in 2010 we collected all minutes of the meetings and / or voting 
results of all Belgian listed companies, which according to the Belgian 
Companies Code (arts 533bis, §2 and 546) must be disclosed on the compa-
nies’ websites. In 2012 it became a mandatory requirement to disclose the 
results of votes of the general meeting. Previously the Belgian Corporate 
Governance Code, known in 2004 as the Lippens Code, contained provi-
sion 8.11 requiring the posting of the results of the votes and the minutes 
of the general meeting on the company’s website as soon as possible after 
the meeting. The 2009 Belgian Code on Corporate Governance resumed 
and applied this provision literally. Hence companies had to disclose 
voting results or explain why they did not comply with this recommenda-
tion. An earlier study found that in 2011 approximately 60 per cent of 
companies complied with provision 8.11 (Van der Elst 2011).
Overall, voting items are seldom contested at AGMs of Belgian com-
panies. In a study by ISS the average opposition was found to be 1.4 per 
cent in 2008 and 2.6 per cent in 2010. Only one item received more than 25 
per cent dissent (ISS 2010). In 2009 this average was 8.2 per cent, but the 
proxy advisor did not provide specific information why the average dif-
fered significantly from the years before and after. Overall, opposition has 
increased recently. In 2015, the average opposition of agenda items soared 
to 4.6 per cent, equal to the 4.6 per cent in 2014 (ISS 2015). Most likely, 
some agenda items experienced high levels of dissent,11 in particular the 
remuneration report. That can explain the difference with 2010 and 2008; 
the pre say on pay era.
11 For example, in 2012, the accounts of Cimescaut, a company that was 
delisted in 2013, were opposed with 35 per cent of the votes (Van der Elst 2013).
M4327-WATSON_9781847203489_t.indd   162 23/06/2017   10:46
 Answering the say for no pay 163
As mentioned above, since 2012 the general meeting of shareholders 
must approve the remuneration report of Belgian listed companies, and 
the voting results are part of the disclosed information. We selected 
all these voting results from 2012 onwards and report the average 
results per year in figure 7.2. As the law was enacted in 2010, a limited 
number of ten companies already started having their remuneration 
reports approved in 2011 (Van der Elst 2012), while only being manda-
torily obliged to do so from 2012 onwards. Results from 2011 are also 
included in figure 7.2.
In 2012, once the new say on pay law went into effect, over 90 per cent 
of the companies put the item ‘remuneration report’ on the agenda of the 
general meeting of shareholders.12 The Belgian companies’ remuneration 
reports received high levels of approval of approximately 94 per cent, 
higher than in 2011, when the ‘voluntary’ voting of the remuneration report 
resulted in an average dissent of 8 per cent. In Bel 20 companies,13 the mean 
approval rate for remuneration reports was 90.6 per cent. A broader set 
12 The other companies did not comply with the law (Van der Elst 2013).
13 Bel 20 is an index of 20 Belgian blue chip stocks.
Sources: own research based on analysis of the minutes of the meetings of Belgian listed 
companies (sample sizes are: 2011: 10 (only a recommended voting item); 2012: 94; 2013: 
95; 2014: 98; 2015: 103; 2016: 94. For 2016 not all companies had held their AGM).
Figure 7.2  Evolution of the dissenting votes for the remuneration reports 
in Belgium
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of companies showed an even higher approval rate of 95.3 per cent. In the 
years after the introduction of the say on pay vote, however, shareholders 
of Belgian companies became more and more dissatisfied with the remu-
neration reports. In 2014, the average opposition almost reached 10 per 
cent and remained high—around 9 per cent—in 2015. In 2016 there was a 
significant drop in the average opposition rate to less than 7 per cent. The 
latter might be influenced by the fact that not all the data have yet been 
disclosed. However, as 85 per cent of the companies provided the results of 
their votes, it is more than likely that shareholders are more satisfied with 
the 2016 remuneration reports than with those in previous years.
Figure 7.2 conceals some companies where shareholder opposition was 
significant. Already in 2012, the shareholders of Agfa approved the com-
pany’s remuneration report by a bare minimum, with only 50.3 per cent 
of votes cast in favour, while the AGM of EVS approved its report with 
64 per cent, and only 69 per cent of the Delhaize shareholders approved 
its report (Van der Elst 2013, 15). Importantly, all three companies have 
a relatively dispersed ownership structure, and the other agenda items 
for the AGM, including the remuneration of the board members, were 
overwhelmingly approved (Van der Elst 2013, 16). Since 2013 each year 
has seen a limited number of general meetings during which shareholders 
voted down the remuneration report, while at a number of other meetings 
more than 20 per cent of the shareholders were dissatisfied with the report. 
The companies that experienced a disapproval of their remuneration 
report will be studied in the next section.
7.4  CORPORATE RESPONSE TO DISAPPROVED 
REMUNERATION REPORTS
7.4.1 United Kingdom
While the number of listed companies in the UK is much larger than 
in Belgium, the number of disapproved remuneration reports is less 
 divergent. The research of BIS found that between 2007 and 2011 there 
were 11 companies in the FTSE All-Share Index that had their remunera-
tion report disapproved (BIS 2012a, 11). This number increases to 19 if 
votes withheld are also counted. From 2012 to 2015, we found ten more 
companies that experienced a no vote on their remuneration report. 
These findings are based on reports of the National Association of 
Pension Funds, LexisNexis Market Tracker Trend Reports, Georgeson 
Proxy Season Reviews, Proxy Insight, Computershare and Capita Asset 
Services. For two companies, William Hill in 2012 and Diploma in 2015, 
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the remuneration report was legally approved as the withheld votes were 
not taken into account, resulting in 51 per cent and 57 per cent approval 
respectively.14 Further, Kents Corporation failed the remuneration 
report vote in 2014, but later that year it was acquired by the Canadian 
SNC-Lavalin and there was no further follow up. The other companies 
that experienced the rejection of the remuneration report between 2012 
and 2015 are reported in table 7.2. The voting results are based on the 
disclosed AGM results on the websites of the companies.15 Aviva, Cairn 
Energy, Pendragon and WPP all had their remuneration reports disap-
proved in 2012, Afren in 2013, Burberry in 2014 and Intertek in 2015. 
The reports of Afren, Cairn Energy and Pendragon received supportive 
votes of less than one third of the total votes. For the other companies, 
only a small majority of the shareholders disapproved the report. Our 
analysis is limited to the say on pay of the remuneration report. The UK 
introduced a mandatory and binding say on pay of the remuneration 
policy in 2014. As far as ascertainable, voting policies have not been 
disapproved so far. Consequently, the remainder of this study disregards 
this voting item.16
At the AGM that followed upon the disapproval of the remuneration 
report, all but one company managed to get more than 90 per cent support 
for the new remuneration report. Only at WPP did a large number of 
shareholders remain concerned about the reported remuneration. WPP 
will be studied in more detail further in this chapter.
Next, we studied the letter of the chairman on the subsequent remunera-
tion report, identifying what steps the company had taken following the 
disapproved report, which elements of the report the shareholders were 
dissatisfied with, as well as how the company adjusted the remuneration 
of the board and executives to regain shareholders’ support. A summary 
of the findings can be found in table 7.2.
All companies started up discussions with shareholders, be it only 
with their largest shareholders or institutional shareholders, identifying 
the concerns which led them to oppose the remuneration report. Some 
companies went even beyond the group that voted at the meeting. Proxy 
agencies or representative bodies of shareholders, like the Association of 
British Insurers, can be helpful in understanding the arguments of share-
holders that voted against the remuneration report, as some shareholders 
14 If the yes votes are offset against the total votes, the approval rates would 
only have been 48.5 and 49.6 per cent.
15 All AGM results are on file with the author.
16 For a study on the evolution of the vote on the remuneration policy, see Van 
der Elst and Lafarre 2017.
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base their vote upon the advice of these bodies. The chairman of the remu-
neration committee of Cairn Energy reported contacts with ‘all relevant 
stakeholders’. It is unclear which other parties, next to shareholders and 
advisory bodies, should be engaged regarding the voting of the remunera-
tion report.
Most subsequent remuneration reports disclose the important share-
holders’ concerns that the company identified in its discussions with 
shareholders after the dissenting vote on the earlier report. The common 
triggering factor for many shareholders to vote against the remuneration 
report is the (procedure to award the) generous bonus, in particular when 
an insufficient relationship between the bonus and the performance of 
the company is evidenced. The weak link between performance and pay 
is closely related with another feature that shareholders consider critical: 
the discretion of the board or the remuneration committee in determining 
compliance with the goals for variable pay. We also discovered that not all 
companies report the concerns of their shareholders. This is a weakness in 
the current model of disclosing and voting on the remuneration report, as 
the final section will discuss.
All subsequent reports provide adjustments of the remuneration pack-
ages and/or policies of the executive directors in the aftermath of a no 
vote. Broadly speaking, companies opted for two types of changes. First, 
some companies such as Burberry changed the disclosure policy, in par-
ticular to illustrate the pay for performance packages of top executives 
better. Burberry’s subsequent DRR of 2014/15 shows very clearly that the 
Table 7.1  Evolution of approval rates of the remuneration reports of UK 
companies of which at least one report was disapproved (%)
2012
report
2013
report
2014
report
2014
policy
2015
report
2016
report
Afren 71.40% 20.29% 91.78% 91.62% in administration**
Aviva 45.59% 99.29% 98.09% 96.88% 98.68% 96.36%
Burberry 96.95% 96.83% 47.32% 84.92% 92.27% −*
Cairn Energy 32.97% 99.51% 99.30% 98.06% 98.59% 93.00%
Intertek 90.93% 94.02% 96.82% 96.44% 47.88% 96.48%
Pendragon 32.21% 97.87% 97.29% 99.31% 84.70% 91.46%
WPP 40.48% 80.58% 81.75% 81.93% 79.97% 66.55%
Notes:
* AGM 2016 did not yet take place.
** According to their website, the company Afren is under administration since 31 July 
2015. In short, administration is a corporate rescue mechanism for companies that are 
operationally viable but facing serious threats from their creditors.
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decrease in profit before tax in the accounting period 2015/16 resulted in 
a sharp 75 per cent decline in the CEO’s remuneration package, foregoing 
the share awards and long-term incentive.17 Second, other companies have 
made significant changes in the structure and/or the incentivizing mecha-
nisms of the remuneration package, in particular in schemes providing 
a short- and/or a long-term bonus for executives, intensifying targets or 
lowering maximum bonus targets.
The absolute amounts of the pay packages seem to be less of an issue, 
or at least it is less formally stressed as a criterion for voting against the 
remuneration report. Shareholders must be convinced that weak perfor-
mance seriously reduces the pay of top executives. Anecdotal evidence 
shows that large remuneration packages alert shareholders to scrutinize 
the performance-pay relationship. The 2012 remuneration report of WPP, 
the advertising company, was voted down. While the total pay package of 
the CEO increased, the total shareholder return in 2013 was -13 per cent. 
WPP restructured the remuneration package of its top executive team. 
However, it did not clarify in its subsequent remuneration report which 
pay concerns led shareholders to issue the dissenting vote. As the remuner-
ation package of its CEO is considered to be among the highest in the UK, 
shareholders continue to question the like-for-like performance growth 
of the company and the pay package (Budden and Oakley 2013, 16). The 
2013 remuneration report experienced significant opposition of 20 per 
cent—or more than 25 per cent if withheld votes are counted—opposition 
rates that continued to be found in subsequent general meetings (table 
7.1).  
The amendment of the targets in the remuneration packages and poli-
cies does not necessarily result in an overall lower remuneration of the top 
executives, as WPP illustrates. At WPP the CEO experienced a decrease in 
basic salary of just over 10 per cent and a 20 per cent decrease in pension 
benefits (table 7.2). Conversely, the reformed LTIP and STIP turned out 
progressively to increase the remuneration of the CEO. In 2015 the CEO 
earned more than £70 million, probably the highest remuneration package 
ever given in the UK. Shareholder opposition is growing, but the remu-
neration report was approved by two thirds of the shareholders. Also, the 
chairman of the remuneration committee received 8.4 per cent no votes, as 
against 6.6 per cent in 2015 and only 1 per cent in 2014. It should be noted 
that the focus on the structure of the pay package, instead of the levels 
of pay, has recently been questioned. The Norwegian sovereign wealth 
17 The total remuneration of the CEO was £7.5 million in 2014/15; it dropped 
to £1.9 million in 2015/16.
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fund announced that it would also take into account pay levels before 
approving the remuneration item (Milne 2016, 1). The manager of Hermes 
Investment Management declared that she felt ‘highly uncomfortable’ 
with the ‘excessive’ size of the pay of WPP’s CEO (table 7.3) (Cookson 
2016, 13).
We also assessed whether shareholders would take the share perfor-
mance to pay relationship into account when voting on the remuneration 
report. Thereto, we consider the stock price development before and after 
the no vote. The share price at the start of the accounting period upon 
which the disapproved remuneration report is based is considered as 100 
per cent. This period is identified as period T. Marked in the evolution of 
the stock price are the date of the general meeting that took place during 
accounting period T (and which thus voted on the remuneration report 
for period T-1), the end of accounting period T, the date of the general 
meeting that disapproved the remuneration report, the end of the sub-
sequent accounting period and the date of the next general meeting that 
approved the subsequent remuneration report. The timeline is presented 
in figure 7.3.
Figure 7.4 provides the evolution of the share price of the companies 
that experienced a dissenting vote on the remuneration report. The 
majority of the companies experienced a significant decrease in share 
price, from 15 to over 50 per cent, during the accounting period after the 
general meeting that took place during the relevant accounting period. 
At first sight, this indicates that shareholders could take this evolution 
into  consideration at the moment they vote on the remuneration report. 
However, Afren saw its share price increasing after the AGM on T-1 and 
the end of the accounting period T (see figure 7.4, left hand scale). At the 
moment the shareholders had to vote on the remuneration report, the 
share price of all  but one had already started to soar (see point AGM 
No vote for DRR of T), while for Burberry and Afren it still was looking 
very promising. At the moment that the subsequent remuneration report 
had to be voted on, only two companies had a stock price that was lower 
than the price at the start of the criticized accounting period. In short, the 
shareholders of these companies seem not to have taken the evolution of 
the stock prices into consideration when they issued their no vote on the 
remuneration report.
7.4.2 Belgium
In the previous section it was shown that dissatisfaction with the remu-
neration report is significantly higher than any other agenda item in the 
AGM, but the averages of dissatisfaction are seldom higher than ten 
M4327-WATSON_9781847203489_t.indd   171 23/06/2017   10:46
172
T
ab
le
 7
.3
 
 E
vo
lu
tio
n 
of
 th
e 
re
m
un
er
at
io
n 
pa
ck
ag
e 
of
 th
e 
C
E
O
 o
f W
P
P
 (
in
 £
 th
ou
sa
nd
s)
B
as
e 
sa
la
ry
B
en
ef
its
D
E
Ps
a
Pe
ns
io
n
ST
IP
L
T
IP
T
ot
al
Sh
ar
e 
pr
ic
e
D
iv
id
en
d
20
10
10
09
37
4
10
81
40
0
28
50
36
29
c
93
43
d
78
9
17
.8
20
11
 (i
n 
re
po
rt
 1
1)
13
06
45
9
13
40
58
5
50
05
e
55
75
f
12
96
1d
67
5
24
.6
20
11
 (i
n 
re
po
rt
 1
2)
13
06
46
6
13
39
58
5
50
05
32
39
11
94
1
 
20
12
13
00
35
6
94
0
58
6
30
78
11
36
8
17
62
8
88
8
28
.5
20
13
11
50
35
0
11
01
46
0
41
15
22
67
0
29
84
6
13
80
34
.2
20
14
11
50
45
3b
12
88
45
6
35
90
36
04
1
42
97
8
13
45
38
.2
20
15
11
50
20
0
15
45
46
0
42
78
62
78
3
70
41
6
15
63
44
.7
N
ot
es
:
a 
D
iv
id
en
d 
E
qu
iv
al
en
t P
ay
m
en
ts
;
b 
re
po
rt
 o
f 2
01
5 
di
sc
lo
se
s 1
79
 a
s t
he
 C
E
O
 p
ai
d 
27
4 
sp
ou
se
s t
ra
ve
l c
os
ts
 b
ac
k;
c 
L
E
A
P 
va
lu
e 
on
 v
es
t/d
ef
er
ra
l d
at
e;
d 
du
e 
to
 d
iff
er
en
t d
isc
lo
se
d 
am
ou
nt
s, 
th
e 
to
ta
l d
iff
er
s f
ro
m
 th
e 
su
m
;
e 
20
11
 A
nn
ua
l c
as
h 
bo
nu
s a
nd
 d
ef
er
re
d 
sh
ar
e 
bo
nu
s (
an
nu
al
 re
po
rt
 m
en
tio
ns
 5
00
5 
on
 p
. 1
37
 a
nd
 3
69
6 
on
 p
. 1
38
);
f 
L
E
A
P 
aw
ar
d.
Su
m
m
ar
y 
of
 d
at
a 
ba
se
d 
on
 d
isc
lo
su
re
s i
n 
th
e 
D
R
R
 o
f t
he
 c
om
pa
ny
. 
M4327-WATSON_9781847203489_t.indd   172 23/06/2017   10:46
 Answering the say for no pay 173
per cent. However, some companies did experience a disapproval of the 
 remuneration report. Our database of the Belgian AGM voting results 
shows that between 2012 and 2016, six companies had one or more 
remuneration reports voted down. It happened for the first time in 2013 
at the meetings of Proximus18 and Galapagos. In 2014, at the meetings of 
Fagron and Agfa Gevaert, the remuneration reports were voted down, 
while Delhaize and (for a second consecutive time) Fagron had their remu-
neration reports disapproved in 2015. In all cases dissatisfaction with the 
remuneration report was very high. At the 2013 meeting of Proximus only 
five per cent of the represented shares approved the report, while at the 
meeting of Nyrstar in 2015 only one of every five represented rights voted 
yes. The other disapproved remuneration reports received between 55 per 
cent and 75 per cent no votes.
Unlike the subsequent UK AGMs, where a large majority of sharehold-
ers approved the adjusted reports, in the majority of the Belgian subse-
quent AGMs a large number of shareholders remained concerned that the 
remuneration report contained, in their view, inappropriate remuneration 
issues. Aside from the specific Proximus case, which will be discussed next, 
two companies managed to address all shareholder concerns, receiving 
approval of the new report by more than 97 per cent.
Which drivers activated shareholders to express their dissatisfac-
tion with the remuneration report has not been studied in Belgium 
with the exception of the specific case of Proximus. The size of the 
CEO remuneration package of this government-controlled telecom 
operator had already been questioned for a number of years.19 The 
18 Formerly Belgacom.
19 When the CEO’s contract was extended in 2009, it was announced that the size 
of his remuneration package had to be significantly reduced. However, his remunera-
tion stayed at a similar level in 2009 and 2010 (BM and BBD 19 March 2012).
Figure 7.3  Timeline of stock price evolution of companies that 
experienced a no vote on the remuneration report
Start of
accounting
period T
AGM on
accounting
period T–1
End of
accounting
period T,
start T+1
AGM with
no vote
(on period T)
End of
accounting
period T+1
AGM T+1
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Socialist party that (together with the Catholic and Liberal parties) 
controlled the government during that era, and that for many years 
was considered supportive of former Proximus CEO Didier Bellens, 
lost its confidence in Bellens in 2013. As a result, at the 2013 general 
meeting the  shareholders disapproved the remuneration report. The 
government withheld its votes, while over 70 per cent of the remaining 
Sources: Pendragon, <www.pendragonplc.com/investors/share_price/>; Aviva, 
<www.aviva.com/investor-relations/share-price/ordinary-shares/share_chart/>; WPP, 
<http://wpp.co.uk/wpp/investor/shareprice/historic/>; Cairn, <http://cairnenergy.com/
index.asp?pageid=168>; London Stock Exchange, <www.londonstockexchange.com/
exchange/prices-and-markets/stocks/summary/>; Quotenet, <www.quotenet.com/stocks/
historical-prices/>.
Figure 7.4  Stock price evolution of UK companies before and after a no 
vote
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 shareholders20 voted against the report because it again showed overly 
generous remuneration packages for the managers and directors.21 Later 
that year, Bellens was dismissed and replaced (Temmerman 2013). The 
new CEO had to agree on a salary of maximum €650,000, less than half 
the remuneration package of the previous CEO (Van Belle 2014). In 
2014 the remuneration report of Proximus was approved, although the 
government still abstained.22
The arguments for disapproving other remuneration reports, and 
the responses of companies confronted with dissatisfied shareholders, 
have not previously been studied. Similar to our study of the reasons 
for voting against the UK remuneration reports and the responses of 
the UK  companies which had their remuneration report disapproved, 
Belgian  disapproved remuneration reports and responses were assessed. A 
summary of findings is presented in table 7.5.
In contrast to the UK companies, not all Belgian companies consulted 
with their major shareholders in the aftermath of a disapproved remuner-
ation report. The subsequent remuneration report of Nyrstar  disclosed a 
20 Only 5 per cent of the attending shareholders supported the remuneration 
report.
21 The minutes of the meeting are available at <www.belgacom.com/assets/ 
content/mbimport/%7B6B2D2E46-9049-46DA-8C21-1BB1DCAF3C1A%7D?trans
formationID=CustomContent&contentType=content/custom&previewSite=cow> 
(last accessed 3 May 2013), archived at <http://perma.cc/GB8Y-F3A3>.
22 The minutes of the meeting are available at <www.belgacom.com/assets/content/
mbimport/%7B4685B5C8-7E07-486D-A94F-7AD0F9AC23E3%7D?transfor ma 
tionID=Custom Content&contentType=content/custom&previewSite=cow> (last 
accessed 20 August 2014), archived at <http://perma.cc/6E9C-PH88>.
Table 7.4  Evolution of approval rates of the remuneration reports of 
Belgian companies of which at least one report was disapproved
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Proximus 89.10% 5.07% 92.31%* 98.19% 97.57%
Fagron 95.99% 84.21% 43.96% 45.33% 72.44%
Nyrstar 85.61% 77.84% 58.05% 20.55% 99.91%
Delhaize 69.61% 89.12% 52.40% 45.63% 52.02%
Agfa Gevaert 50.28% 55.60% 33.96% 97.59% 95.55%
Galapagos 99.66% 25.69% 60.13% 60.96% 55.93%
Note: * 79.97% withheld votes.
Source: own research based on the minutes of the meetings of listed companies.
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number of adjustments to satisfy shareholders, but it remained unclear 
how the company identified the causes of the no vote. However, the 
adjusted remuneration report received almost unanimous support. It 
should be noted that in the meantime a new shareholder, Trafigura, 
gained a significant voting block in Nyrstar (approximately 25 per cent). 
During the Nyrstar 2015 AGM two representatives of this shareholder 
Trafigura were elected, via a shareholder proposal, as directors of 
Nyrstar. Hence if these representatives supported the new remuneration 
report, the company could be confident that the shareholders would 
approve the report during the subsequent meeting. Indeed, the voting 
block of Trafigura represents approximately two thirds of the attending 
votes of the 2016 general meeting of Nyrstar, and the meeting approved 
the report.
Another company, Fagron, not only did not consult its sharehold-
ers after the defeat of its remuneration report, but the chairman of 
the board was angered that shareholders voted against the report. 
According to the minutes of the meeting he declared that ‘the remu-
neration report is an integral part of the annual report in which it is 
explained from which provisions in the Corporate Governance Code 
the remuneration report deviates’. The chairman continued that ‘the 
company already in the past had explained why the company—based 
on reasons that are company-specific—considers it desirable to deviate 
from some corporate governance “regulations”23 which were, in accord-
ance with the Corporate Governance Code explained in a comply or 
explain manner in the annual report’. He opined that ‘the new share-
holder structure creates the problem that some of the shareholders are 
voting negatively in accordance with the recommendations of the proxy 
advisors for the only reason that some elements are not in compliance 
with the Corporate Governance Code, irrespective the underlying and 
company-specific reasons and arguments of the company to deviate 
from these points’.24 The shareholders did not raise any questions 
before the agenda item was voted. The minutes of the meeting of the 
AGM of the subsequent year, during which the remuneration report 
was again disapproved, contains identical remarks by the chairman. The 
company not only did not consult the shareholders, but also made clear 
that the board of directors considered the negative advisory vote of the 
23 The Belgian Corporate Governance Code does not use the term 
‘regulation’.
24 Author’s own translation of the minutes of the meeting of Fagron on 12 
May 2014, 11.
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shareholders inappropriate. Before the dissenting vote on the second 
remuneration report, the shareholders raised a number of questions. 
However, those questions were related to the new Warrant Plan, and 
it is hard to see how this plan could have influenced the shareholders’ 
no vote. For the second year in a row, the company announced that 
there were no plans to make  adjustments to its remuneration policy. 
The  remuneration package of both the CEO and the other members of 
the executive committee remained more or less unchanged (though the 
 composition of the committee changed), with the exception of the short-
term bonus, which was curbed in 2015 as the targets were not reached 
(table 7.6).
While the approach of the board of directors and the chairman, 
blaming the inappropriate dissenting votes of the majority of participat-
ing shareholders, can hardly be considered cooperative, the response 
of the shareholders is of limited value. The shareholders are ventilating 
their discontent with the remuneration report. If shareholders do not 
stand up during the meeting and disclose their reasons for disapprov-
ing the report, the board of directors might consider this response of 
the chairman of the board as sufficient. The logic of this shareholder 
voicing is difficult to interpret. After two disapprovals, a third, similar, 
remuneration report of Fagron was approved. During the Q&A that 
preceded the vote, one of the shareholders addressed for the first time 
a particular remuneration report issue: the termination benefits of 18 
months for the previous CEO, which the shareholder considered exces-
sive. This issue was explained in the previous remuneration reports as 
the main deviation from the best compensation practices in the Belgian 
Corporate Governance Code. It might have been expected that this 
shareholder would have raised the issue during one of the previous 
Table 7.6 Remuneration of top management of Fagron 2013–15
In € thousands CEO Other members exec. com.
2013 2014 2015 2013 2014 2015
Base salary 500 600 598 1174 1009 1882
Variable remuneration 600 720 0 410 430 222
Pensions and other  
 remuneration
32 31 35 30 0 108
Granted warrants 0 0 0 0 0 0
Number of share options/ 
 warrants
325,000 200,000 75,000 265,000 115,000 397,875
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general meetings.25 In the meantime, some shareholders that agreed 
to recapitalize the company26 have thus acquired larger stakes in the 
company and are already involved in the management of the company, 
and it is therefore reasonable to assume that they are supportive of the 
current remuneration report and its included remuneration policy.
Belgian companies that have consulted their shareholders do not neces-
sarily report the results of the inquiry, nor the arguments of the sharehold-
ers nor the adjustments the company has taken to align the remuneration 
report with the views of consulted shareholders. Galapagos announced 
that it would try to identify the reasons for shareholders’ disapproving the 
remuneration report, but never disclosed the results of its inquiry. Two 
other companies addressed the defeat of the report and the ensuing actions 
in more detail. Agfa explained in a very detailed manner the performance 
metrics which were used, as well as the ways to calculate the remuneration 
of the top management. As far as we could ascertain, the remuneration 
policy itself was not adjusted. Delhaize identified that (according to the 
responding shareholders) the no vote was related to the inadequacy of the 
remuneration itself. Following these findings, the company ‘has made some 
additional changes to some programs’. While the shareholders appreciated 
the approach of the former company and were satisfied with the additional 
disclosure, ‘some additional changes’ were considered as largely insufficient 
by a large number of Delhaize shareholders. Consequently, while Agfa had 
its subsequent remuneration report approved with a more than 97 per cent 
vote, Delhaize’s subsequent report was considered barely sufficient, as only 
52 per cent of shareholders supported it.
Anecdotal evidence shows that the presentation of the adjustments 
might significantly influence the support of the shareholders. Previously 
we noted that Agfa extensively addressed the measures of performance 
and the accompanying remuneration packages of the management, while 
no major changes to this package were introduced. The subsequent 
report received a very high level of support. Galapagos did not report 
on any kind of adjustments of the remuneration package or policies. 
The subsequent report was only approved with a majority of 60 per 
cent. In the latter case, it could be that the remuneration practices were 
adjusted without explicitly disclosing the new practices. Therefore, we 
also compared the remuneration policy and packages, as well as goals and 
25 However, it is not known whether this shareholder was also present and/or 
a shareholder in the previous accounting periods.
26 All information on these recapitalization procedures can be found on the 
website of the company <www.fagron.be> last accessed 15 June 2016.
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metrics that the company is using for motivating the management of the 
company, between the year during which the remuneration report was 
disapproved and those of the subsequent year. We found two differences. 
First, the goals for setting the short-term bonus were adjusted. The bonus 
is partially dependent on the goals of the company. In 2012 these goals 
included ‘elements of revenue, cash flow, operating profitability, clinical 
trial results and licensing’, all of which were considered to be of equal 
importance (Galapagos 2012, 21), while in 2013 they included ‘elements 
of revenue, operating profitability, clinical trial progression and business 
development’, again all of equal importance (Galapagos 2013, 22). Next, 
the 2013 report added a new discretionary power for the board. It can 
grant ‘exceptional special bonuses, outside the scope of the regular bonus 
schemes . . . upon recommendation of the Nomination and Remuneration 
Committee in the event of and for exceptional achievements’ (Galapagos 
2013, 23). More discretionary power for the board of directors is generally 
less appreciated by shareholders. Therefore it could be that the lower level 
of support for the new remuneration report was partially due to this newly 
granted right for the board of directors.
For the UK companies, we studied the relationship of share perfor-
mance to pay before and after the no vote. Similarly, for the Belgian 
companies we investigated whether shareholders take the share price 
development into account in voting against the remuneration report. 
Figure 7.5 shows the evolution of the share price of companies that 
experienced a dissenting vote on the remuneration report. The share price 
at the start of the accounting period related to which the remuneration 
report is disapproved is considered as 100 per cent. We included the stock 
price at the general meeting that took place during the accounting period, 
the stock price at the end of the accounting period, the stock price at the 
time of the general meeting that disapproved the remuneration report, the 
stock price at the end of the subsequent accounting period and the stock 
price at the time of the next general meeting that approved or disapproved 
the subsequent remuneration report.
In contrast to the UK companies, all Belgian companies experienced 
a significant increase in share price of 7–45 per cent during the account-
ing period, and all but one company’s shares continued to soar after the 
accounting period running to the general meeting that disapproved the 
remuneration report. The share price development after the no vote shows 
a mixed picture. For Nyrstar and Fagron in 2015, the stock price dramati-
cally dropped to levels that required capital increases, while the share price 
of other companies increased. Overall, the results confirm the UK find-
ings. The share price developments as such seem unrelated to the no vote 
on the remuneration report.
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7.5 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
This qualitative study of the effects of a no vote on the remuneration 
report shows that since its inception say on pay has regularly resulted in 
disapproved remuneration reports. Say on pay established a new trend in 
shareholders voicing their discontent with boards’ decision and policy-
making. Previously, the shareholders’ voice was only exceptionally heard.
The disapproval of a remuneration report signals to the board of direc-
tors that responding is key. In the UK especially, boards are alert for this 
dissenting opinion and directors are discussing with shareholders which 
remuneration elements have raised the latter’s concern. The chairman of the 
remuneration committee reports the reasons that the company has identi-
fied as drivers for dissent, and the subsequent report provides details of 
measures to align remuneration practices with the interests of shareholders. 
Belgian companies are less transparent. Some companies do not disclose 
Source: Euronext.
Figure 7.5  Stock price evolution of Belgian companies before and after a 
no vote
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any reason why shareholders could have disapproved the  remuneration 
report, and one blames shareholders for following the ‘one size fits all’ 
opinion of proxy advisors. At best, Belgian companies are more transparent 
about the applied remuneration practices. Consequently, support for the 
subsequent remuneration report of Belgian companies remains significantly 
lower than that of shareholders in the UK after a dissenting vote.
Further, our study shows how the process of say on pay could be further 
improved, especially in Belgium. While the legislator provides in detail 
how the remuneration report should be structured, the shareholder can 
only approve or disapprove the overall report. Shareholders can disclose 
their opinion on how they will cast their vote either before or during the 
general meeting, but few shareholders are actively disseminating their 
voting intentions. After the votes have been cast, only the UK provides 
guidelines of the steps that the company must take: it must identify the 
reasons for the dissenting votes and outline the actions taken in response. 
The effect of these guidelines is visible. The Belgian reports are vague 
and hardly informative in the follow up to the dissenting vote, while UK 
companies address these issues in their reports. It is recommended that 
Belgium provide guidelines similar to those applicable in the UK.
There is another issue that regulators can consider, related to the 
vote on the remuneration report. Boards of directors can, but are not 
 compelled to take measures after the company experiences a no vote. This 
is a key feature of an advisory vote. Hence, the phenomenon of say on pay 
is at odds with the traditional legal framework. It is the first item on the 
agenda of the shareholders that is legally consolidated with an advisory 
vote in most countries that introduced say on pay. Contrary to many 
other ‘corporate governance code-related’ proposals, say on pay is being 
upgraded in the Corporate Act or Code. This upgrade only concerns the 
duty to organize a shareholder’s vote. The voting result is not binding.27 
If other AGM agenda items are not supported by a majority of votes, 
they are consequently rejected and the board of directors is not allowed 
to execute the rejected proposal. But when it comes to the remuneration 
report, we find that Fagron experienced a dissenting vote twice but did not 
amend its remuneration practices, and neither did the shareholders express 
their reasons for disapproving those remuneration reports.
Also, some other boards provided some minor changes to the 
 remuneration practices, like the board of Delhaize, or the board could 
convince shareholders that it was a one-time occurrence, like the board 
27 There are exceptions, such as the UK vote on the remuneration policy, 
which is binding.
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of Burberry. Tiny changes can do the job, but the voting results of the 
subsequent general meeting of Delhaize show that shareholders expected 
an in-depth review. Consequently, even when the vote for the remu-
neration report is only advisory and/or the second remuneration report 
is approved, it risks unnecessary escalation towards other binding issues 
or voting items when the shareholders’ concerns over remuneration prac-
tices are not taken seriously.28 Van der Elst and Lafarre show that when 
shareholders of the Dutch company Vastned disagreed with a proposed 
additional bonus, they refused to discharge the supervisory board (Van 
der Elst and Lafarre 2017). Only when Vastned’s board promised not to 
provide these kinds of bonuses in future did the shareholders approve the 
discharge of the board members in the follow-up general meeting. Similar 
shareholder opposition could be found at the meeting of Heineken. 
However, as this company is family controlled, only the majority of 
the outsider shareholders disapproved the discharge of the supervisory 
board. It is reasonable to expect similar behaviour from shareholders that 
disagree with the remuneration report and experience a poor response 
from the board of directors.
Therefore it might be considered adding, next to the aforementioned 
guidelines, that after a dissenting vote, the vote for the subsequent 
remuneration report is binding and that the board must, if the report is 
voted down for a second time, take measures to amend the remuneration 
practices in accordance with the views of shareholders. This duty should 
be shared with the shareholders. Shareholders that continue to be dissatis-
fied with the remuneration practices must disclose their arguments for 
disapproving the subsequent remuneration report. At first sight this rule 
resembles the Australian two-strike rule. However, our proposal does not 
require a resolution to determine whether the board must stand for re-
election (Thomas and Van der Elst 2015, 670–73). Neither does it set the 
threshold at 25 per cent, as the Australian rule does. However, the latter 
can serve as an example to structure the process. The combination of an 
advisory and a binding vote will also solve the awkward voting results for 
the remuneration report at Fagron, where the remuneration report was 
disapproved twice and yet the third, still unchanged remuneration report 
was supported. The combination of a first advisory and second binding 
vote for the remuneration report can also prevent other institutional 
changes29 that disturb this fragile equilibrium of the first advisory vote on 
the remuneration report.
28 We refer to the Vastned case, see below.
29 As the Renault case illustrates (see introduction).
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The combination of an advisory and a subsequent binding vote could 
also strengthen the binding vote for the remuneration policy that was 
implemented in the UK and is proposed at European level, as the 
company should not only apply an approved remuneration policy but 
also adhere to remuneration practices that shareholders support. The 
remuneration policy should in particular address the issue of ‘golden 
hello’ or other welcome packages. Currently, the remuneration report is 
backward-looking; shareholders are informed too late of the entrance fees 
of executives. This was the major concern of the shareholders of Intertek 
and Burberry when disapproving their remuneration reports.
Related to the previous finding as to the fragile nature of a mandatory 
advisory vote, we also noticed that a majority vote of the shareholders 
is no longer considered sufficient support for the board’s behaviour. 
Although it was not part of this investigation of current voting practices, 
we observed that the remuneration resolution must be adopted with an 
overwhelming majority before the remuneration practices are considered 
appropriate. Depending on the source, dissenting votes of 10 per cent, 20 
per cent or 30 per cent require a response from the company, its board of 
directors and remuneration committee. A response is even mandatory in 
the UK when ‘significant dissent’ (an undefined standard) is registered.30 
Previously, it was shown that the CG100 requires the board of directors 
to take action as soon as the remuneration item is not supported by at 
least 80 per cent of the represented shares at the meeting. This practice 
shifts the remuneration issue from a common agenda item to a special 
agenda item. It is common practice in many countries that decisions 
which are considered pivotal for companies, like a change of the articles 
of association or a merger or division of the company, require super-
majority approval. As the remuneration item must be supported with a 
majority of 80 per cent of the attending shares, a similar supermajority 
requirement is de facto introduced.31 When the remuneration item is not 
approved with more than 80 per cent, the board of directors must also 
30 In Australia the 25 per cent dissenting votes threshold can be  considered 
a special majority, as in the two strike rule there is the opportunity to ‘spill 
the board’ if the company remuneration report receives a negative recep-
tion of 25 per cent of the votes at two consecutive AGMs (Corporations 
Act 2001, s 300A(1)(g); see also Corporations Amendment (Improving 
Accountability on Director and Executive Remuneration) Act 2011, Explanatory 
Memorandum, 6).
31 It must be noted that important decisions of the general meeting not only 
need supermajority approval but often also a minimum quorum requirement, 
which is not required for the approval of the remuneration item.
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take action for lowering the number of dissenting votes for the remunera-
tion item.
To the extent that many of these features are addressed in the proposal 
for a new European shareholder rights directive, we support this directive. 
Our findings suggest that remuneration is a key topic for developing a 
sound debate between the board and the shareholders. 
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